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PRELIMINARY DRAFT – COMMENTS APPRECIATED 
Easy on the SALT 
A Qualified Defense of the Deduction for State and Local Taxes 
 
Daniel Hemel* 
 
DRAFT — Oct. 28, 2017 
  
Congressional Republicans and Trump administration officials have said 
that they plan to repeal the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes (SALT) 
as part of a comprehensive tax reform package. This essay critically examines the 
major arguments for repealing the SALT deduction. Repealing the deduction and 
using the resulting revenues to reduce federal rates across the board would likely 
lead to greater tax-induced deadweight loss overall. Repealing the deduction also 
would distort decisions about the financing of education and health care, which 
together account for more than half of all state and local government spending. 
Repeal would further encourage a shift from nonbusiness to business taxes at the 
state and local level, and potentially would result in more borrowing by subnational 
governments in the short and medium term. It would have ambiguous effects on the 
progressivity of the overall tax system, and it would exacerbate existing differences 
in federal tax burdens across states. The essay concludes that the case against the 
SALT deduction fails on its own terms, and that the status quo of partial 
deductibility offers a number of underappreciated advantages vis-à-vis the 
alternative of full repeal. 
 
 
The state and local tax deduction is in danger. House Speaker Paul Ryan’s June 2016 
blueprint for tax reform proposed to eliminate it.1 Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in April 
2017 that the Trump administration wanted to dump the deduction too.2 The “Unified Framework” 
for tax reform published by the White House and congressional leaders in late September 2017 
implicitly calls for repeal of the deduction by leaving it off the list of itemized deductions that 
would be retained.3 The state and local tax deduction—included in every version of the federal 
income tax since the Civil War—may finally be on its way out. 
                                                
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; dhemel@uchicago.edu. The 
author thanks Thomas Brennan, Shu-Yi Oei, James Repetti, Diane Ring, Victor Thuronyi, and 
participants in the Boston College Tax Policy Workshop for thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft. 
1 See Paul Ryan et al., A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America—Tax 20 (2016) (“To 
simplify tax filings further for middle-income families, this Blueprint reflects the elimination of 
all itemized deductions except the mortgage interest deduction and the charitable contribution 
deduction.”). 
2 See Jennifer McLoughlin, Trump’s Tax Plan Dumps State, Local Tax Deduction, Bloomberg 
BNA Daily Tax Report (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.bna.com/trumps-tax-plan-n57982087246. 
3 Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/27/unified-framework-fixing-our-broken-
tax-code. 
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Opponents of the state and local tax (SALT) deduction make five main arguments against 
it. First, the deduction narrows the federal tax base, meaning that Congress must impose higher 
marginal tax rates (leading to larger deadweight losses) in order to meet its revenue goals.4 Second, 
the deduction reduces the after-tax price of goods and services supplied by states and localities 
relative to goods and services supplied through the market, thus leading to overprovision of goods 
and services by subnational government.5 Third, the deductibility of some but not all payments to 
states and localities distorts those governments’ choices among tax instruments.6 Fourth, the 
deduction disproportionately benefits high-income households and so makes the overall tax system 
more regressive.7 Fifth, the deduction leads to inequities across jurisdictions, with low-tax states 
effectively subsidizing higher-tax states.8 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Rachel Greszler & Kevin D. Dayaratna, Time to End the Federal Subsidy for High-
Tax States, Heritage Found.: Backgrounder, No. 2999, at 2, 4-5 (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/BG2999.pdf; Jeremy Horpedahl & Harrison 
Searles, The Deduction of State and Local Taxes from Federal Income Taxes 3 (Mercatus Ctr. at 
George Mason Univ., Mercatus on Policy, Mar. 2014), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Horpedahl_State-Deductions_MOP_030614.pdf; Jason 
Pye, Tax Reform Should End the Deduction for State and Local Taxes to Finance Lower Tax 
Rates, FreedomWorks (May 9, 2017), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/tax-reform-should-
end-deduction-state-and-local-taxes-finance-lower-tax-rates. 
5 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes 
under the Federal Income Tax, 82 Va. L. Rev. 413, 489 (1996) (“[W]hen taxes are deductible, 
residents do not bear the full cost of their jurisdiction’s public goods and services. As a result, 
residents will tend to favor greater public provision than otherwise . . . . If provision would 
otherwise be undistorted, the result might involve excessive provision of some goods and 
services and inefficient production of others . . . .”); Frank Sammartino and Kim Rueben, 
Revisiting the State and Local Tax Deduction, Tax Policy Ctr. 7 (Mar. 31, 2016), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2000693-revisiting-the-state-and-local-tax-deduction.pdf 
(stating that the SALT deduction can “distort choices about the level of subnational government 
spending”). 
6 See, e.g., Sammartino & Rueben, supra note 5, at 7 (“The deduction may encourage states to 
adopt a less economically efficient mix of taxes, relying more heavily on deductible taxes than 
on nondeductible user fees.”). 
7 See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, Tilts in the Tax Code: Pictures of Regressive Deductions, Wash. 
Post, July 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/07/30/tilts-inthe-
tax-code-pictures-of-regressive-deductions (describing SALT deduction as “regressive”); Ben 
Casselman, The Tax Deductions Economists Hate, FiveThirtyEight (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-tax-deductions-economists-hate (“The deduction for state 
and local taxes helps the rich even more than the mortgage-interest deduction.”); The Blue Tax, 
Nat’l Rev., Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/335632/blue-tax-editors 
(SALT deduction is a “regressive subsidy”). 
8 See, e.g., Greszler & Dayaratna, supra note 4, at 2-3; Jared Walczak, The State and Local Tax 
Deduction: A Primer, Tax Found., Fiscal Fact No. 545, at 6 (Mar. 2017), 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20170315142330/Tax-Foundation-FF545.pdf (“Just as the state 
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All of these arguments are faulty. Repealing the deduction to finance an across-the-board 
rate cut would raise the combined (federal plus state) marginal rate for households in high-tax 
states and reduce the combined marginal rate for households in low-tax states; basic principles of 
public economics suggest that the net effect of these two changes on the supply of labor and capital 
is likely to be negative. As for the charge that the deduction distorts decisions about the provision 
of public goods and the financing of subnational government: repealing the deduction would 
remove some of these distortions but introduce several others. Finally, repealing the deduction 
would have ambiguous effects on both progressivity and interstate equity. 
 
The literature on the SALT deduction is extensive.9 This essay does not seek to recapitulate 
all of the arguments that have been made in favor of the deduction and against. Instead, it 
emphasizes a number of new or underappreciated points that are relevant to the repeal proposals 
emerging from the Republican leadership. Among others: 
 
— While the “broad base rule,” which recommends lower rates on a broader base to 
minimize the deadweight loss of taxation, is sometimes invoked as a reason for repealing 
the SALT deduction, the intuition underlying the broad base rule may actually weigh in 
the SALT deduction’s favor; 
 
— Insofar as state and local tax taxes fund educational expenditures (the number one 
category of state and local government spending), full deductibility is appropriate under 
the consumption tax principles animating the Unified Framework; 
 
— Insofar as state and local tax taxes fund health care expenditures (the number two 
category of state and local government spending), full deductibility is necessary to ensure 
equal treatment of employer-provided and subnational government-provided health care; 
 
— Repealing the SALT deduction while retaining the charitable contribution deduction—
which is what the Unified Framework proposes to do—would distort collective decisions 
regarding the financing of public goods; 
 
— Repealing the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes while retaining the 
deduction for taxes paid by businesses—which is also what the Unified Framework 
apparently proposes—would introduce new distortions into the choice of revenue-raising 
instruments for state and local governments; 
                                                
and local tax deduction disproportionately favors wealthier taxpayers, it also benefits states 
which combine high incomes and high-tax environments.”). 
9 Significant contributions in the law review literature include Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to 
State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 Mich. L. 
Rev. 805 (2008); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local 
Taxes under the Federal Income Tax, 82 Va. L. Rev. 413 (1996); and Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal 
Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local 
Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1389 (2004). 
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— Repealing the SALT deduction would potentially lead to an increase in state and local 
government borrowing unless Congress could credibly commit not to revive the 
deduction down the road; 
 
— Notwithstanding the fact that the benefits of the SALT deduction accrue 
disproportionately to high-income households, repeal of the SALT deduction in the 
service of across-the-board rate cuts would potentially make the federal tax system less 
progressive in important respects; and 
 
— While interstate equity is a dubious objective for federal tax policy in the first place, 
those who believe that the federal government should seek to allocate the burdens and 
benefits of federal taxing and spending evenly across states ought to support—not 
oppose—the SALT deduction on those grounds. 
 
Part I provides a brief overview of the SALT deduction and the debate surrounding it. Part 
II considers the deduction’s effect on labor supply, capital investment, and overall economic 
growth. Part III evaluates the effects of the deduction on the revenue-raising and spending 
decisions of state and local governments. Part IV takes up equity-related arguments for and against 
the deduction. Part V concludes. 
 
I.   The SALT Deduction: An Overview 
 
A.  Evolution of the Deduction 
 
 The deductibility of state and local taxes has been a feature of the federal income tax 
throughout its history. The first federal income tax statute, the Revenue Act of 1861, allowed a 
deduction for “all national, state, or local taxes assessed upon property, from which income is 
derived,”10 and Congress extended the deduction to nonbusiness state and local taxes four years 
later.11 When the federal income tax was resurrected briefly in 1894, the deduction for all state and 
local taxes was revived as well.12 The deduction reemerged in the Revenue Act of 1913, the first 
federal income tax statute enacted after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.13 It has remained 
ever since, though with several notable modifications and fluctuations.14 
 
 First, while the deductibility of state and local income as well as real and personal property 
taxes has been a constant, the deductibility of state and local sales taxes has not been. The Revenue 
                                                
10 See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309. The Revenue Act of 1861 never went into 
effect, but the Revenue Act of 1862, which did take effect, included a nearly identical provision. 
See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 91, 12 Stat. 473-74. 
11 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 479. On the early history of the SALT deduction, see 
William J. Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions in an Income Tax—The Ideal, 66 Cornell L. 
Rev. 262, 264-66 (1981). 
12 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 553. 
13 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167. 
14 See Turnier, supra note 11, at 267-69. 
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Act of 1964 limited the sales tax deduction to taxes on general sales, gasoline, and motor fuel, thus 
disallowing deductions for taxes on motor vehicle licenses, alcohol, and cigarettes (among 
others).15 The Revenue Act of 1978 eliminated the deduction for state and local taxes on gasoline 
and motor vehicle fuel,16 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dispensed with the deduction for sales 
taxes entirely.17 From then until 2004, the status quo was that nonbusiness state and local income 
and property taxes were deductible, while nonbusiness sales taxes were not. 
 
 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 changed the SALT status quo in one important 
way: it gave taxpayers the opportunity to deduct state and local income taxes or state and local 
sales taxes (but not both).18 The 2004 law also instructed the IRS to prescribe tables that allow 
taxpayers to estimate their state and local sales taxes based on their adjusted gross income, filing 
status, number of dependents, and the general sales tax rates in their state and locality.19 Though 
the option to deduct state and local sales taxes was initially enacted as a temporary measure and 
set to expire at the end of 2005,20 Congress has extended the option ever since, finally making it 
permanent at the end of 2015.21 
 
 Significantly, the treatment of sales taxes under section 164 means that taxpayers cannot 
deduct all state and local taxes paid. Thirty-nine states impose taxes on both income and general 
sales, meaning that taxpayers will lose the ability to deduct one or the other. The only exceptions 
are Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon, which have income taxes but not general 
sales taxes; Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming, which have 
general sales taxes but not income taxes; and Alaska, which has neither an income tax nor a general 
sales tax (though some localities impose sales taxes of their own).22 Yet all of those states have 
selective sales taxes of some sort for which no deduction is allowed (e.g., taxes on alcoholic 
beverages, amusements, gambling, insurance premiums, motor fuels, tobacco, and utilities).23 
Thus, there is no state in which taxpayers have the option to deduct all state and local taxes paid. 
 
 Beyond the introduction of the option to deduct state and local sales taxes, three other 
changes affecting the SALT deduction merit mention. One is the advent of the standard 
                                                
15 Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 207, 78 Stat. 40; see Turnier, supra note 11, at 268 & n.31. 
16 Pub. L. No. 95-600, § __, 92 Stat. __. 
17 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § __, 100 Stat. __. 
18 Pub. L. No. 108-357, § __, 118 Stat. __ (codified at I.R.C. § 164(b)(5)). 
19 Id. § __, 100 Stat. __ (codified at I.R.C. § 164(b)(5)(H)). 
20 Id. § __, 100 Stat. __. 
21 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § __, __ Stat. __. 
22 See Julie Garber, State Tax Chart, The Balance (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://www.thebalance.com/state-tax-chart-3505461 New Hampshire’s income tax applies only 
to interest and dividends, not to salaries and wages. Tennessee also has an income tax that 
applies only to interest and dividends. 
23 U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections Detailed 
Table (May 12, 2017), https://www.census.gov/govs/statetax. 
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deduction—initially introduced in 1944.24 The fraction of taxpayers claiming the standard 
deduction has fluctuated over time—in tax year 2014, the most recent year for which 
comprehensive data are available, 69.0% of individual income tax returns claimed the standard 
deduction.25 Since the SALT deduction is available only to itemizers, this means that less than 
one-third of individuals filing federal income tax returns claim any deduction for nonbusiness state 
and local taxes. 
 
A second significant development is the advent of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). 
Introduced in 1969, the AMT has become an increasingly important element of the federal tax 
system over time. The percentage of tax returns showing liability under the AMT has climbed 
from around 0.1% in 1990 to nearly 2.9% in 2014 (the most recent year for which data is 
available).26 The primary effect of the AMT on taxpayers who are subject to it is to reduce the 
value of the SALT deduction. Note that the AMT does not eliminate the value of the SALT 
deduction for taxpayers who are subject to it, even though state and local taxes are not deductible 
for AMT purposes. This is because taxpayers who are subject to the AMT still generally pay less 
than they would have if their liabilities had been calculated under the normal tax without a SALT 
deduction. For these taxpayers, the AMT diminishes the value of the SALT deduction—but not all 
the way down to zero.27  
 
A third development is the introduction and resurrection of the Pease provision, which was 
in effect from 1991 through 2009 and has been in place from 2013 to the present. The Pease 
provision, also known as the overall limitation on itemized deductions, drives a wedge between 
the marginal rate and the rate at which deductions can be taken for taxpayers with adjusted gross 
income above a certain threshold ($261,500 in 2017 for single taxpayers, $313,800 for married 
                                                
24 On the history of the standard deduction, see John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The 
Standard Deduction and the Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 Colum. J. Tax 
Law 203, 209-18 (2011). 
25 Internal Revenue Serv., Statistics of Income Div., Publication 1304 tbl.1.3 (Aug. 2016). 
26 Id. 
27 To illustrate (using a publicly available tax return as an example): Tim Kaine and Anne Holton 
reported taxable income of $253,901 in 2014—including a $21,567 deduction for state and local 
taxes in that calculation. Their liability under the normal tax would have been $59,409; their 
tentative minimum tax for AMT purposes was $63,606; and so they paid the latter (larger) 
amount. But while the SALT deduction played no role in the calculation of their $63,606 liability 
under the AMT, they nonetheless received a benefit from the SALT deduction. That is because 
in the absence of the SALT deduction, their taxable income would have been $275,468, and their 
liability under the normal tax would have been $66,807. Another way of thinking about this is 
that while they would have received a SALT deduction worth $7,147 (33% times $21,657) under 
normal tax principles, while instead they received a benefit worth $3,201 (the difference between 
their liability under normal tax principles and under the AMT). That is, the AMT reduced the 
value of the SALT deduction to the Kaines by roughly 55%, not by 100%. See Tax Analysts, 
Tax History Project: Presidential Tax Returns 
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/web/presidentialtaxreturns (last visited Aug. 30, 
2017) (follow link for Vice Presidential Candidate Tim Kaine’s 2014 return). 
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couples filing jointly).28 For taxpayers in the highest bracket, the effect is to increase the top 
marginal rate from 39.6% to 40.8% while still allowing deductions only at the lower 39.6% rate. 
This 1.2 percentage point increase is on top of Medicare taxes, which raise the top marginal rate 
for high-income households by as much as 3.8 percentage points to 44.6% without affecting the 
rate at which deductions can be taken.29 The Pease provision and Medicare taxes have the effect 
of limiting the SALT deduction for top-bracket taxpayers to approximately 89 cents for every $1 
of deductible state and local taxes paid (39.6%/44.6% ≈ 0.89).  
 
These limits on the value of the SALT deduction matter for purposes of the present debate 
because they reduce the justificatory burden for SALT deduction defenders. That is, defenders of 
the SALT status quo must explain why a partial deduction for state and local taxes is appropriate—
but need not explain why a full deduction would be appropriate because full deductibility is not 
the status quo. To be sure, one might accept the argument for partial deductibility but argue that 
the current rate of deductibility is too high (or too low). The central claim here is that a rule of zero 
deductibility is normatively undesirable, though I am much less confident that the current 
patchwork of limits on the value of the SALT deduction gets the rate of deductibility just right. 
 
B.  The State of the Debate 
 
 Much of the debate over the SALT deduction so far has focused on the question of 
horizontal equity. To concretize the question: Imagine that State X imposes a 10% income tax and 
State Y imposes no income tax. Imagine, moreover, that Worker A in State X earns 100, while 
Worker B in State Y earns 100 and Worker C in State Y earns 90. If we want the federal tax system 
to treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly, does that mean Worker A should pay the same 
amount in federal taxes are Worker B (no SALT deduction), the same amount as Worker C (full 
deduction), or less than Worker B but more than Worker C (the partial deductibility status quo)? 
 
 The horizontal equity debate has gone on for decades without reaching a clear resolution. 
Three observations stand out. First, at least with respect to the deduction for state and local income 
taxes, the answer to the deductibility question matters little for horizontal equity among workers 
if labor is fully mobile. To see why, imagine a federal tax rate of 40% and a Worker W who can 
earn 100 pre-tax (60 after taxes) by working for a firm in tax-free State Y. Assume, moreover, that 
there is no difference in amenity levels between State X and State Y but that State X imposes a 
10% tax.30 For a firm in State X to lure Worker W, it must offer him a wage such that he ends up 
                                                
28 See I.R.C. § 68. 
29 See I.R.C. §§ 1411, 3101, 3111.  
30 Adding in amenity level differences complicates the arithmetic but does not alter the result. To 
illustrate: Assume that taxes in State X finance amenities that Worker W values at 5. For worker 
W to be indifferent between the job in State X and the job in State Y, the offer from the firm in 
State X must leave him with 55 on an after-tax basis (plus untaxed amenities worth 5 equals 60). 
With no SALT deduction, the offer must be at least 110, in which case Worker W will pay 11 in 
state taxes and 44 in federal taxes, leaving him with 55 on an after-tax basis. With a SALT 
deduction, the offer must be at least 101.85, in which case Worker W will pay 10.19 in state 
taxes and 36.67 in federal taxes, leaving him with 55 (rounded) on an after-tax basis (plus 
untaxed amenities worth 5 equals 60). The key point is that insofar as State X offers amenities 
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at least as well off as in State Y (60 after taxes). With no SALT deduction, the offer must be at 
least 120, in which case Worker W will pay 12 in State X taxes and 48 in federal taxes, ending up 
with 60 on an after-tax basis. With a SALT deduction, the offer must be at least 111.11, in which 
case Worker W will pay 11.11 in State X taxes and 40 in federal taxes, ending up with 60 on an 
after-tax basis. Worker W is essentially indifferent as to whether there is or is not a SALT 
deduction: he ends up with 60 after taxes either way, and the SALT deduction only affects the cost 
to his employer. 
 
 To be sure, even with (indeed, especially with) full labor mobility, the SALT deduction 
affects the relative wealth of employers in State X and State Y. Firms in high-tax states benefit if 
the deduction is preserved; firms in low-tax states benefit if the deduction is repealed (assuming 
that the resulting revenues are used to cut federal rates across the board). However, horizontal 
equity supplies neither an argument for deductibility nor against: the principle of horizontal equity 
tells us that if two individuals are similarly situated pre-tax, then we should tax the two of them 
similarly as well, but a taxpayer’s pre-tax economic situation is itself endogenous to whether we 
allow a SALT deduction. A similar argument applies with respect to the deduction for property 
taxes: turning on or off the SALT deduction for property taxes affects prices of owner-occupied 
residential real estate in State X and State Y, but that difference is likely to be reflected in house 
prices. Horizontal equity does not supply a reason for favoring one policy over the other.31  
 
 Second, if labor is immobile, then deductibility potentially affects horizontal equity among 
workers but not in a way that yields clear policy implications. Imagine that State X and State Y 
impose no income tax, that Worker A in State X and Worker B in State Y each earn 100, and that 
State X then imposes a tax of t that funds amenities per capita of a. Worker A may now be worse 
off than Worker B (if the value of a < t) or may be better off than Worker B (if the value of a > t). 
Because of labor immobility, wages do not adjust to restore equality between Worker A and 
Worker B. 
 
                                                
that State Y does not, those amenity differences will be reflected in wage differences when labor 
is fully mobile.  
31 See Kaplow, supra note 5, at 454-56. To illustrate: Imagine two homes, one in State X and the 
other in State Y, both of which cost 100 in a tax-free world. Assume a risk-free rate of return of 
10% and that real estate is a risk-free asset. The user cost of living in either house is 10 per year 
(equal to the opportunity cost of capital, or the rate of return times the home price). Now imagine 
that State X levies a property tax of 1 per year and State Y levies no property tax. Assume that the 
federal tax rate is 40%, that there is no deduction for state and local property taxes, and that there 
is no amenity-level difference resulting from the new tax. For a potential homeowner to be 
indifferent between the house in State X and the house in State Y, the price on the house in State 
X must fall from 100 to 90 (in which case the user cost of living in the State X house, 1 in property 
taxes plus a capital cost of 9, will equal the user cost of living in the State Y house). With a 
deduction for state and local property taxes, the after-federal-tax cost of the property tax bill on 
the house in State X falls from 1 to 0.6, and the potential homeowner is indifferent between a house 
priced at 94 in State X and a house priced at 100 in State Y (in which case the user cost of living 
in the State X house, 0.6 in tax-related costs plus a capital cost of 9.4, will equal the user cost of 
living in the State Y house).  
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 As a thought experiment, Louis Kaplow more than two decades ago proposed allowing a 
deduction for state and local taxes but then adding back to taxable income some estimate of a (i.e., 
the value of amenities provided by subnational government).32 Assuming that state and local taxes 
paid exceed amenities for high-income households, such a scheme would look something like 
partial deductibility—which is the de facto regime for high-income households under the status 
quo. Arguably, lower-income households (for whom amenities more likely exceed state and local 
taxes paid) are being undertaxed under the status quo: while most lower-income households do 
not itemize and therefore claim no deduction for state and local income taxes, Kaplow’s proposal 
might suggest that these households should bear a positive tax liability if on net they receive more 
from states and localities than they pay. Note, though, that if we think of intrajurisdictional 
transfers between net payors and net recipients as gifts mediated through state and local 
governments, then deduction for net payors and inclusion for net recipients would be inconsistent 
with the income tax’s general treatment of gifts—which are neither deductible to the giver nor 
included in the income of the giftee. (This point is considered at greater length in Section II.B.) 
 
 Third, underlying the horizontal equity debate over the SALT deduction is the question of 
why we care about horizontal equity in the first place. A plausible view is that our worry about 
horizontal equity is derivative of our concern about vertical equity.33 An additional dollar delivers 
greater utility to a poor person than to a rich one, and so transferring the dollar from the rich person 
to the poor person increases total welfare. Likewise, if two individuals have the same income (and, 
by hypothesis, the same marginal utility of income), then welfare is maximized by taxing the two 
of them the same. Put differently: If A and B have the same pre-tax income but A pays more in 
taxes, and the marginal utility of income is diminishing over income, then A’s marginal utility of 
income is greater than B’s; welfare can be enhanced by transferring dollars from B to A—which 
is to say, by shifting a portion of the tax burden from A to B. To decide who should be a transferor 
and who should be a transferee, we need a reasonably accurate measure of each individual’s 
marginal utility of income. The Internal Revenue Code’s system of inclusions, exclusions, 
deductions, and exemptions aims to do just that. 
 
 A focus on the marginal utility of income changes the terms of the debate over the SALT 
deduction. The question becomes not whether Worker A in State X who earns income of i, pays 
states taxes of t, and receives amenities of a is better off or worse off than Worker B in State Y 
who earns income of i, pays no state taxes, and receives no amenities. Rather, the question becomes 
whether Worker A in State X who earns income of i, pays state taxes of t, and receives amenities 
of a has a higher or lower marginal utility of income than Worker B in State Y who earns income 
of i, pays no state taxes, and receives no amenities. The answers to these two questions may differ 
because not all increases to utility diminish the marginal utility of income. Amenities provided by 
subnational governments may be substitutes for market consumption (in which case we might 
think that the marginal utility of income decreases over a) or may be complements to market 
consumption (in which case we might think that the marginal utility of income increases over a). 
 
                                                
32 See id. at 423-30. 
33 See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 Nat’l Tax J. 139 
(1989). 
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 Consider, for example, the provision of police services. Arguably, police services function 
as a substitute for private security services that taxpayers would otherwise pay for out of pocket; 
taxpayers in jurisdictions with high-quality public policing therefore may have more disposable 
income available for (non-security) consumption, and so a lower marginal utility of income. But 
police services also can be complements to consumption insofar as they increase the value to 
individuals of market-purchased goods. A taxpayer might be more inclined to buy, say, a fancy 
sports car if the risk of theft or vandalism is low. Effective policing may expand and enrich the 
taxpayer’s menu of consumption possibilities, thus raising the marginal utility of income.34 From 
a welfarist perspective, the decision whether to allow a deduction for state and local taxes arguably 
depends not only on whether amenities (a) are greater than, equal to, or less than state and local 
taxes paid (t), but also on whether those amenities are substitutes for or complements to other 
goods and services.  
 
 The takeaway from this discussion is that even if labor is immobile, and even if the value 
of amenities provided by subnational government can be quantified, horizontal equity principles 
do not yield concrete implications for the deductibility of state and local taxes. Normative 
evaluations of the SALT deduction likely must rest on other bases. Parts II and III consider 
efficiency-related arguments for and against the deduction; Part IV turns to arguments based on 
principles of vertical equity and equity across states. 
 
II.  Broadening the Base To Lower Rates? 
 
One motivation for repeal of the SALT deduction is base-broadening. As the House 
Republicans’ blueprint emphasizes, “carve-outs reduce tax revenue,” which, “in turn, typically 
requires increases in marginal rates to make up for lost revenue.”35 When marginal rates are higher, 
individuals are more likely to choose leisure over labor and less likely to make new investments. 
On this view, repealing the SALT deduction and using the resulting revenue to lower marginal 
rates would unleash economic growth. I will refer to this argument as the base-broadening 
argument. 
 
The problem with the base-broadening argument as applied to the SALT deduction is that 
the deduction itself affects the combined federal-plus-state marginal tax rate on labor and capital 
income for the households that claim it. Repealing the SALT deduction and using the resulting 
revenues to reduce federal tax rates across the board will lower the combined federal-plus-state 
                                                
34 This point is related to—though not quite the same as—the classic Corlett-Hague tax rule, 
which holds that complements to labor should be taxed at a lower rate than complements to 
leisure. See W.J. Corlett & D.C. Hague, Complementarity and the Excess Burden, 21 Rev. Econ. 
Studs. 21 (1953). Some goods and services provided by state and local governments are labor 
complements (e.g., job training and commuter bus and rail lines); others are leisure complements 
(e.g., public parks). The Corlett-Hague rule may yield the recommendation that expenditures on 
state and local government be treated differently than other expenditures (either taxed at a lower 
rate if state and local taxes primarily fund the provision of labor complements, or taxed at a 
higher rate if state and local taxes primarily fund leisure complements). I will defer discussion of 
the actual uses of state and local tax dollars to Section III.1. 
35 Ryan et al., supra note 1, at 32. 
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marginal rate for households in low-tax states while raising the combined federal-plus-state 
marginal rate for households in high-tax states. The likely net effect is to increase the total 
deadweight loss of taxation—contrary to the objective behind base-broadening. 
 
 In an Appendix, I present a rudimentary model that illustrates the point more formally. I 
assume that labor supply is unit elastic and that the burden of taxation falls entirely on labor (which 
is assumed to be immobile). The model involves two states with equal populations: one state (State 
X) that imposes a 10% income tax, and another state (State Y) that imposes no income tax. The 
federal tax rate is 40% with a SALT deduction, meaning that the combined federal-plus-state 
marginal rate in State X is 46% (i.e., 40% federal plus 10% state minus 4% for the SALT 
deduction) and the combined rate in State Y is 40% (i.e., 40% federal with no state addition). 
Under these conditions, I show that repealing the SALT deduction reduces total labor output by 
approximately 0.56% and increases deadweight loss by approximately 2.31%. 
 
This basic result holds so long as the price elasticity of labor supply in high-tax states is 
roughly equal to the price elasticity of labor supply in low-tax states. It is concededly possible that 
tax-insensitive individuals migrate to high-tax states (State X in the running example) while tax-
sensitive individuals sort to low-tax states (State Y), in which case cuts in the effective tax rate in 
State Y may do more to spur labor output than tax hikes in State X would do to dampen. The 
burden on those advancing the base-broadening argument for SALT repeal is to show that the 
difference in elasticities is sufficient to justify an intervention that would widen the gap between 
effective rates in high-tax and low-tax states. Until then, the base-broadening argument for SALT 
repeal should be considered questionable at best. 
 
The same analysis that applies to the deduction for state and local income taxes also applies 
to the deduction for state and local sales taxes, because the sales tax deduction—as implemented—
is based on income.36 There is, however, one significant category of state and local taxes to which 
the base-broadening argument for SALT repeal does apply: state and local property taxes on 
owner-occupied homes. The deduction for state and local property taxes does not reduce the 
combined federal-plus-state marginal rate on labor or capital income for any taxpayer, and so 
repealing the deduction for property taxes and using the revenue to reduce marginal rates across 
the board would be consistent with the intuition underlying prescriptions for base-broadening, rate-
lowering tax reform.  
 
Note, though, that the deduction for state and local property taxes on owner-occupied 
homes accounts for less than one-third of the federal tax expenditure associated with the SALT 
deduction.37 Insofar as the base-broadening argument supports SALT repeal at all, it would support 
                                                
36 Taxpayers who claim the itemized deduction for sales taxes generally use a calculator that 
estimates their sales taxes paid based on location, income, and household size. See Internal 
Revenue Serv., Sales Tax Deduction Calculator, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/sales-tax-
deduction-calculator (last updated Nov. 28, 2016).  
37 The Joint Committee on Taxation’s expenditure estimate for the deduction for state and local 
real property taxes is $36.4 billion for fiscal year 2018; the expenditure estimate for the 
deduction of other nonbusiness state and local government taxes is $74.1 billion. Staff of the J. 
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only the repeal of the deduction for state and local property taxes. And even that step—repeal of 
the deduction for state and local property taxes on owner-occupied homes—would seem to be in 
tension with the reasoning of the Unified Framework. While recommending the repeal of other 
itemized deductions, the Unified Framework would retain the home mortgage interest deduction 
on the view that the deduction promotes homeownership, which in turn “strengthen[s] civil 
society.”38 But the deduction for state and local property taxes on owner-occupied homes promotes 
homeownership as well—and unlike the home mortgage interest deduction, which delivers a larger 
benefits to recent homebuyers who still have large mortgage loan balances, the deduction for state 
and local property taxes on owner-occupied homes rewards households who remain a stable 
presence in their communities. Preserving the mortgage interest deduction while repealing the 
deduction for state and local property taxes on owner-occupied homes reflects an incoherent 
approach to the promoting the positive externalities (arguably39) associated with homeownership. 
 
III.  Efficiency of State and Local Government Decisionmaking 
 
A second set of arguments for repeal of the SALT deduction focuses on the effect of the 
deduction on state and local government decisionmaking. Opponents of the deduction claim that 
(a) the deduction reduces the after-tax cost of goods and services provided by state and local 
governments relative to goods and services provided through market mechanisms, leading to 
excessive and inefficient provision of goods and services by states and localities; and (b) the 
deductibility of some but not all payments to subnational governments distorts the choice of 
revenue-raising instruments by states and localities. At least in the context of other features of the 
House Republicans’ blueprint, neither argument provides a persuasive reason for repealing the 
deduction. 
 
A.  Effect on the Provision of Goods and Services  
 
Consider first the claim that the SALT deduction leads to excessive and inefficient 
provision of goods and services and by states and localities. This section highlights two problems 
with that argument: (1) well over half of state and local government spending goes toward 
education and health care, and the deductibility of those expenditures is (at least arguably) 
consistent with the principles underlying the Unified Framework; and (2) deductibility for 
charitable contributions but not state and local taxes would (further) distort the choice between the 
nonprofit sector and subnational government as provider of public goods and services. 
 
1.  Deductions for What?  
 
More than one-third of state and local government spending goes toward education 
(elementary, secondary, and higher), and the next largest spending category is health care (through 
                                                
Comm. on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2016-2020, at 32, 
40 tbl.1 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
38 Unified Framework, supra note 3, at 4. 
39 On the potential positive and negative externalities associated with homeownership, see 
generally Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 17 Tax Policy and the Economy 37 (2003). 
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Medicaid/the Children’s Health Insurance Program and otherwise).40 (For a more detailed 
breakdown, see Table 1.) These two categories together account for more than half of all state and 
local spending.41 The question of whether state and local taxes should be deductible thus largely 
comes down to the questions of (i) whether expenditures on education should be deductible and 
(ii) whether expenditures on health care should be deductible. 
 
The answers to those questions depend, in part, on whether the relevant tax is an income 
tax or a consumption tax. Under an income tax, investments in human capital—like investments 
in physical capital—should arguably be capitalized and then amortized over their useful lives. The 
useful life of a high school or college degree might approximate the working life of the degree 
holder. This might suggest that taxpayers should be able to deduct a portion of the cost of their 
education each year. Immediate deduction for educational expenditures, however, would seem to 
be inconsistent with the capitalization-and-amortization principle underlying the income tax.42 Yet 
the Unified Framework departs from income tax principles by allowing businesses to claim an 
immediate deduction for capital expenditures (at least for the next five years).43 This would 
transform the income tax into a consumption tax: a tax on income minus savings/investment. Parity 
between the tax treatment of physical capital and the tax treatment of human capital would then 
require an immediate deduction for educational expenditures (i.e., investments in human capital 
assets). 
 
  
                                                
40 See also Urban Inst., State and Local Expenditures, http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-
center-initiatives/state-local-finance-initiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-
local-expenditures (last visited Aug. 29, 2017). The Urban Institute statistics split health care 
spending across the “public welfare” and “health and hospitals” category, with most Medicaid 
spending placed in the former category. 
41 See id.; see also Medicaid’s Share of State Budgets, Medicaid & CHIP Payment & Access 
Comm’n, https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/medicaids-share-of-state-budgets (last visited Aug. 
29, 2017) (showing that more than half of all state spending in fiscal year 2015 went toward 
Medicaid and education). 
42 See Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1477, 1491, 
1500-01 (1994); Michael Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1981, 2018-19 
(2015). 
43 See Unified Framework, supra note 3, at 7. 
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Table 1. State and Local Government Expenditures by Category, 2013-201444 
Category Percentage of Direct General Expenditures 
(excluding general administration and 
interest) 
Education 36.6% 
     Elementary and Secondary      23.7% 
     Higher Education      10.9% 
     Other Education      2.0% 
Public Welfare Vendor Payments (including 
Medicaid/CHIP) 
17.8% 
Health and Hospitals 10.3% 
Public Safety 9.5% 
     Police      4.1% 
     Fire      1.8% 
     Corrections      3.0% 
     Other Public Safety      0.6% 
Transportation 7.8% 
     Highways      3.5% 
     Airports      0.9% 
     Other Transportation      3.4% 
Sewage and Solid Waste Management 3.0% 
Housing and Community Development 2.0% 
Parks and Recreation 1.5% 
Other 11.5% 
 
The fact that the taxpayers claiming the SALT deduction are not always the same people 
as the students acquiring the relevant human capital does not change matters. Under the Unified 
Framework, A could claim an immediate deduction for a capital expenditure and then transfer the 
capital asset to B, who would be taxed on income generated by the asset. Analogously, public 
financing of elementary, secondary, and higher education involves a large number of As (i.e., 
taxpayers) investing in the development of human capital, claiming immediate deductions, and 
transferring that human capital to a large number of Bs (i.e., public school and university students), 
who are then taxed on the resulting income (wages). State and local governments mediate 
thousands or (in some cases) millions of such transfers.45  
 
                                                
44 U.S. Census Bureau, 2014 Annual Surveys of State and Local Government Finances, Table 1.  
State and Local Government Finances by Level of Government and by State: 2013-14 (Dec. 7, 
2016). 
45 Each of these transfers would presumably fall below the $14,000-per-year threshold for the 
taxation of gifts. While many households pay more than $14,000 per year in state and local 
taxes, it is doubtful that they pay more than $14,000 per year per beneficiary. 
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 One response to this line of argument is that education—or, at least, higher education—
“produces utility beyond an increase in future wages”46 (e.g., the joy of learning, campus social 
life, and lifelong friendships). Insofar as that is the case, then an immediate and full deduction for 
educational expenditures might not be appropriate under consumption tax principles. It is, 
however, often the case that capital expenditures will yield some collateral consumption benefit 
(e.g., the CEO may derive aesthetic pleasure from a refurbished corporate headquarters). These 
collateral consumption benefits might be a reason to limit deductibility through mechanisms such 
as the Pease provision and the AMT; they provide a weak basis for repealing the SALT deduction 
entirely. 
 
 The appropriate treatment of health care expenditures under a consumption tax is 
somewhat less certain than the appropriate treatment of educational expenditures. Insofar as good 
health enhances productivity, immediate deduction is consistent with consumption tax principles. 
The characterization of health care expenditures as productivity-enhancing investments is less 
compelling with respect to patients who are beyond working age, but states and localities play a 
secondary role to the federal Medicare program in funding health care for retirees. 
 
 Analysis of the SALT deduction as applied to health care spending by subnational 
governments also requires consideration of the treatment of health care spending elsewhere in the 
Internal Revenue Code. Most significantly, the exclusion of employer-provided health care is the 
largest single federal tax expenditure, amounting to approximately $173 billion for fiscal year 2018 
(i.e., $62 billion more than the expenditure associated with the SALT deduction).47 The House 
Republicans’ blueprint would preserve that expenditure: while stating that taxpayers “generally” 
should “include in income any compensation received related to employment or self-
employment,” the blueprint prioritizes “quality health care” as one of “[t]wo pressing national 
priorities” that “require exceptions to this general rule.”48 (The other is retirement security.) The 
Unified Framework does not directly address the exclusion of employer-sponsored health 
insurance, but there is no indication that the drafters foresee a change to the status quo treatment. 
 
 Insofar as subnational government revenues go toward health care expenditures, 
deductibility for state and local taxes establishes parity between the tax treatment of health care 
spending by states and localities, on the one hand, and the treatment of health care spending by 
employers, on the other. In both cases, the expenditure is deductible to the payor (i.e., the taxpayer 
or employer) and excluded from the income of the payee. Again, this is consistent with the 
characterization of health care spending as a human capital investment and the treatment of other 
capital expenditures under a consumption tax regime. 
 
 To be sure, the argument that educational and health care expenditures should be deductible 
under a consumption tax only gets us a little more than halfway toward justifying the SALT 
deduction under consumption tax principles because educational and health care expenditures 
account for only a little more than half of all state and local government spending. The largest 
                                                
46 Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs—Or Why Costs of Higher 
Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 Ohio St. L. J. 927, 939 (1993). 
47 See Staff of the J. Comm. on Taxation, supra note 37, at 37 tbl.1. 
48 See Ryan et al., supra note 1, at 28. 
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remaining categories include public safety (9.5%) and transportation (7.8%). As for expenditures 
on police and corrections, deductibility is not obviously inconsistent with consumption tax 
principles insofar as law enforcement is an expense of protecting physical and human capital from 
damage.49 As for transportation, highways and other infrastructure are complements to both labor 
and leisure: smoother roads make us more productive and also allow us easier access to beaches, 
parks, malls, and movie theaters. Neither a rule of full deductibility nor a rule disallowing 
deductibility would seem to be appropriate. 
 
 In sum, the claim that the SALT deduction distorts by allowing taxpayers to purchase goods 
and services from subnational governments with after-federal-tax dollars overlooks the fact that 
the goods and services purchased from subnational governments are very often goods and services 
for which taxpayers otherwise could claim deductions under consumption tax principles. 
Concededly, there is an element of consumption to expenditures on education, health care, law 
enforcement, and roads, just as there is often an element of consumption to capital expenditures 
more generally (and under a consumption tax, consumption expenditures should not be 
deductible). At the same time, a rule disallowing deductibility would impose a higher effective tax 
rate on productivity-enhancing investments channeled through subnational government than on 
capital investments in the private sector. Leveling the playing field between subnational 
government and the private sector is thus a very weak argument for repealing the SALT deduction. 
 
 One might ask whether this same argument would support repeal of the SALT deduction 
in the event that the Republicans’ tax plan is rejected. That question generates two responses. First, 
while the analysis above suggested that immediate deductibility might not be the appropriate 
treatment of educational and other long-term productivity-enhancing expenditures under an 
income tax, total repeal of the SALT deduction would not lead to appropriate treatment either. 
Parity between subnational government and the private sector would require capitalization and 
amortization of expenditures on productivity-enhancing investments with useful lives longer than 
one year. The status quo of partial deductibility arguably comes closer to approximating this 
capitalization-and-amortization approach than the House Republicans’ alternative of full repeal.  
 
Second, the proposal for immediate deductibility of capital expenditures in the House 
Republicans’ blueprint is arguably the last step in a decades-long march toward consumption 
taxation, and we are already far down the path regardless of what happens to tax reform in the 
current Congress. For most American households—whose primary investments are in their homes, 
their IRAs and 401(k) plans, and their life insurance policies—the federal tax system as it affects 
them comes closer to a consumption tax than an income tax. The exclusion of net imputed rent 
and the $500,000 capital gains exemption for home sales lead to yield-exemption treatment for 
owner-occupied real estate, which—in light of the immediate deduction-yield exemption 
equivalence—conforms (more or less) to consumption tax principles. The immediate deduction 
for contributions to traditional IRAs and the exclusion for contributions to 401(k) plans 
approximate a tax on income minus savings, which is to say, consumption. The nontaxation of 
“inside build up” in long-term life insurance policies is likewise consistent with consumption tax 
                                                
49 Income tax principles would seem to support an immediate deduction for law enforcement 
expenditures just as surely as consumption tax principles, as the relevant expense is recurring. 
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principles, though not with income tax principles.50 Finally, the decline of dividend yields on 
publicly traded stocks, the preferential tax rate on qualified dividends and capital gains, and the 
basis step-up for capital assets held at death all combine to drive the effective tax rate on equity 
investments down toward zero—even for stocks held in taxable accounts. The SALT deduction as 
applied to educational and (arguably) health care expenditures is consistent with these other 
features of the federal tax system regardless of whether the final brick in the consumption tax 
edifice—capital expensing—becomes law. 
 
 2.  Subnational Government vs. the Charitable Sector 
 
 The analysis in the preceding subsection compared the tax treatment of (on the one hand) 
goods and services purchased through subnational government and (on the other hand) the tax 
treatment of similar goods and services purchased through market institutions. There is, of course, 
a third supplier of education, health care, and public goods more generally: the charitable sector. 
Following state and local institutions, charities are the leading providers of elementary, secondary, 
and higher education. Charities also operate more than half of all hospitals in the United States.51 
The tax treatment of contributions to these charitable institutions potentially influences the debate 
over the SALT deduction. 
 
 Martin Sullivan has argued that it would be “strange and unfair” to allow a deduction for 
charitable contributions but not for state and local taxes.52 Oddity and equity aside, there is also a 
strong efficiency argument as to why the charitable contribution deduction and the SALT 
deduction should go hand in hand. Retaining the former while repealing the latter would encourage 
communities to favor charitable institutions over state and local governments as providers of 
education and health care even when state and local governments might be the more efficient 
providers of those services. An anti-distortion rationale would seem to suggest that both should be 
repealed or both should be retained. 
 
 The House Republicans’ blueprint promised to preserve the charitable contribution 
deduction. According to the blueprint, “Americans are generous people who want to help their 
neighbors in need,” and the tax system therefore should continue to encourage charitable giving 
through a deduction.53 The Unified Framework calls for the charitable contribution deduction to 
be retained as well.54 Neither House Republicans nor Trump administration officials have offered 
any rationale as to why “help[ing] . . . neighbors in need” through the charitable sector should lead 
to a deduction while doing the same through state and local government should not. 
 
B.  Effect on Revenue-Raising by State and Local Governments 
                                                
50 See Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hyrbid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1145, 1153 (1992). 
51 See Am. Hospital Ass’n, Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-
studies/fast-facts.shtml (last updated Jan. 2017). 
52 Martin A. Sullivan, Why the SALT Deduction Is Always Under Attack, Tax Notes, Dec. 17, 
2012, at 1261, 1264. 
53 See Ryan et al., supra note 1, at 21. 
54 See Unified Framework, supra note 3, at 5. 
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 Just as the SALT deduction is often attacked on the ground that it distorts decisions about 
the provision of goods and services by subnational government, so too is it attacked on the ground 
that it distorts the choice of revenue-raising instruments for states and localities. Again, the charge 
proves unpersuasive upon closer inspection. 
 
1.  Business vs. Nonbusiness Taxes 
 
Significantly, neither the House Republicans’ blueprint nor the Unified Framework says 
anything about changing the treatment of state and local taxes paid by businesses. Repealing the 
itemized deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes while retaining the deduction for taxes 
paid by businesses would potentially encourage states and localities to shift from the former to the 
latter.55 Consider again the case of Worker W in State X earning 100 pre-tax. Assume now that 
State X imposes an income tax of 10% and that the federal government imposes an income tax of 
40%. With the SALT deduction, Worker W pays 40% x (100 – 10) = 36 in federal taxes. Now 
imagine that Congress repeals the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes but not for state 
and local taxes paid by businesses. State X can lift the tax on Worker W and impose a new 
employer-side tax of 11.11% on wages paid. Worker W’s employer can pay her 90 in wages and 
pay a state tax of 11.11% x 90 = 10. After-tax results for all parties are the same as before, and all 
state taxes remain deductible for federal purposes. 
 
 This observation gives rise to at least two questions. First, if states and localities can 
preserve deductibility by shifting the nominal incidence of taxes to businesses, then why get so 
worked up about repeal of the SALT deduction? And second, if states and localities have this 
option, why don’t they exercise it already? After all, most workers cannot deduct state and local 
income taxes (because they take the standard deduction), and even those taxpayers who itemize 
often cannot deduct state and local income taxes in full (because of Medicare taxes and—in some 
cases—the Pease provision and the AMT). The fact that we still see states and localities imposing 
taxes on nonbusinesses seems to suggest that arbitrage is not as easy as the previous paragraph 
makes it out to be. 
 
 With respect to the latter question, behavioral considerations may provide a partial answer. 
If workers focus on pre-tax wages, then they might prefer a wage of 100 and a state income tax of 
10 over a wage of 90 and an employer-side payroll tax. Alternatively (and in my view more 
plausibly), states and localities may decide that administrative and other advantages of taxing 
income at the individual level outweigh the federal tax benefits of taxing employers on wages paid. 
Taxing income at the individual level allows for greater progressivity when some individuals have 
multiple income sources. (An employer-side tax on wages paid could in theory be progressive, 
with the rate rising over wages per worker; however, that would lead to a lower tax on Worker V 
who earns 50 each from two employers than on Worker W who earns 100 from one employer.) 
Individual-level taxation also allows states and localities to adjust tax burdens based on 
characteristics such as marital status, family size, medical expenses, and so on. States and localities 
may decide that the benefits of being able to tailor liabilities to individual characteristics outweigh 
the federal tax considerations. 
                                                
55 See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 461-69. 
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 The observation that employer-side taxation leads to a loss of tailored progressivity 
supplies an answer to the why-get-so-worked-up question as well. If nonbusiness taxes and 
business taxes were equivalent, then there would be little reason to care about the deduction for 
nonbusiness taxes. But if there are meaningful differences between the two, then there arises a real 
concern that repeal of the deduction for nonbusiness taxes will lead states and localities to shift to 
what—in the absence of a federal tax incentive—would be their less preferred method. While 
existing limits on the SALT deduction (i.e., the standard deduction, Pease, Medicare taxes, and the 
AMT) already give some impetus to such a shift, total repeal of the SALT deduction would turn 
the dial up.   
 
 To be sure, the status quo already distorts state and local government decisions regarding 
revenue-raising to some degree. States and localities have an incentive to choose either income 
taxation or sales taxation even if the optimal system would involve a mix of both. They have an 
incentive to avoid selective sales taxes (such as on alcohol and tobacco) even when those taxes 
might be consistent with Pigouvian prescriptions. The point here is that repealing the deduction 
for nonbusiness taxes while sticking with the status quo for business taxes simply replaces one 
federally induced distortion for another. 
 
2.  Now vs. Later 
 
 Any tax plan repealing the SALT deduction that becomes law during the current Congress 
will almost certainly pass via the budget reconciliation process, which allows the bill to bypass the 
legislative filibuster and pass the Senate with 51 votes (or 50 votes plus the Vice President as a 
tiebreaker).56 Reconciliation legislation is subject to the so-called Byrd rule,57 which requires 
(among other criteria) that reconciliation bills cannot add to the deficit outside the reconciliation 
“window” (generally 10 years or less58). That it itself does not stand in the way of permanent repeal 
of the SALT deduction because repeal would subtract from (not add to) the long-term deficit. 
However, repealing the SALT deduction by a narrow majority may introduce distortions because 
of the de facto temporary nature of such a measure. 
 
 If opponents of the SALT deduction build a broad-based congressional coalition that backs 
repeal, then that would send a credible signal to states and localities that repeal is likely to be 
permanent. Repeal by a bare majority, however, may lead states and localities to question whether 
repeal will stick. If states and localities expect that the SALT deduction will be restored in the near 
or medium term, then they will have a strong incentive to borrow today so as to defer tax 
                                                
56 See Brian Faler, GOP Plots to Return to Temporary Tax Cuts, Politico (Aug. 29, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/29/son-of-bush-gop-plots-return-to-temporary-tax-cuts-
242154. 
57 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(E). 
58 See Sahil Kapur, Republicans Warm to Tactic for Making Deep Cuts Last Longer, Bloomberg 
(June 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-15/gop-momentum-builds-
to-change-rules-for-longer-lasting-tax-cuts. 
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collections to a time when payments will be deductible.59 This is especially true if the tax 
exemption for interest on state and local bonds remains. (The House Republicans’ blueprint and 
the Unified Framework say nothing about the state and local bond exemption, and President-elect 
Trump reportedly told mayors in December 2016 that the exemption would be preserved.60) And 
it is especially disconcerting if state and local government debt undermines electoral accountability 
and raises the risk of jurisdictional “death spirals.”61 
 
 This observation can be considered the flip side of Jason Oh’s argument that “[b]efore we 
can evaluate the desirability of any piece of temporary legislation, we must first understand the 
political uncertainty surrounding its renewal.”62 By the same token, before we can evaluate the 
desirability of any piece of nominally permanent legislation, we must first understand the political 
uncertainty surrounding its reversal. This is not to say that the SALT reduction should be retained 
just because repeal might conceivably be reversed. It is to say, though, that there are real-world 
costs that come with repeal by a narrow, partisan, and potentially fleeting majority. 
  
IV.  Vertical and Interstate Equity 
 
 A last set of arguments for repealing the SALT deduction focuses on equity concerns of a 
different sort than the horizontal equity claims examined in Section I.B. First, proponents of repeal 
argue that the SALT deduction’s benefits flow disproportionately to the very wealthy. Second, 
                                                
59 States may be somewhat constrained by balanced budget requirements, which bind to a 
varying degree in 46 states. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES 
IN THE STATES 52 tbl.9 (2015). 
60 See Josh Dawsey, Mayors Startled When Trump Promises to Keep Tax-Exempt Bonds, 
Politico (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/mayors-trump-tax-exempt-
bonds-232720. 
61 As Julie Roin writes: 
 
It is economically rational for voters to elect politicians who will provide debt-financed 
public benefits when they have the option of moving to another jurisdiction before that 
debt falls due . . . .  Such voters can have their proverbial cake—valuable public 
services—and “eat it too” by foisting the costs of debt repayments onto some 
combination of continuing and new residents, investors, and public employees. 
Moreover, the perverse incentives provided by this exit . . . option can make it harder for 
jurisdictions to return to solvency, as any financial demands placed upon remaining 
residents encourages more to leave the jurisdiction, and discourages newcomers from 
entering. In short, the “exit option” sets the stage for the sort of “death spiral” 
experienced by cities such as Detroit, Gary, and Stockton—and perhaps soon to be seen 
in Illinois and New Jersey.  
 
Julie A. Roin, Retroactive Taxation, Unfunded Pensions, and Shadow Bankruptcies, 102 Iowa L. 
Rev. 559, 562 (2017). 
62 Jason S. Oh, The Pivotal Politics of Temporary Legislation, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1055, 1056 
(2015). 
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they argue that the SALT deduction forces low-tax states to subsidize high-tax states. Upon closer 
scrutiny, however, the case for repeal of the SALT deduction on these grounds is quite weak. 
 
A.  Vertical Equity 
 
 High-income households pay more in state and local taxes and are more likely to itemize 
deductions on their federal returns; unsurprisingly, the benefits of the SALT deduction flow largely 
to wealthy. Indeed, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, households in the top percentile 
of the income distribution will claim 37.1% of all SALT deduction benefits in 2017, and 
households in the top decile will claim 71% of SALT deduction benefits.63 
 
 One might therefore think that repeal of the SALT deduction would reduce inequality on 
an after-tax basis—i.e., it would make the bottom nine deciles better off relative to the top decile 
and the top percentile. Yet that intuition is not necessarily accurate if repeal comes coupled with 
rate reductions across the board. That is because the share of individual income taxes paid by 
households in the top percentile and top decile is even larger than the share of SALT deduction 
benefits that those groups claim: according to Treasury, households in the top percentile of the 
income distribution will pay 44.9% of all individual income taxes in 2017, and households in the 
top decile will pay 80.9%.64 The groups that benefit the most from the SALT deduction are also 
the groups that would benefit the most from the rate reductions that repeal of the SALT deduction 
could finance. 
 
 In a forthcoming article, Kyle Rozema and I estimate the distributional effects of repealing 
the SALT deduction and using the resulting revenues to reduce taxes across the board. We find 
that the distributional consequences are highly sensitive to the form of the accompanying tax cut. 
One of the scenarios we model is as follows: the SALT deduction is repealed, all households 
calculate their tax liability without the SALT deduction, and the additional revenue from SALT 
repeal is rebated to households in proportion to their tax liability. We find that this revenue-neutral 
repeal of the SALT deduction would increase after-tax income inequality: on the whole, the 
bottom nine deciles would pay more while the top decile and top percentile would pay less.65 The 
feature of the federal income tax system driving this result is the fact that high-income households 
claim a disproportionate share of SALT deduction benefits but pay an even greater share of all 
individual income taxes. 
 
                                                
63 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Distribution Table 2017 004c, Share of 
Tax Benefits of Selected Individual Income Tax Expenditures by Income Class (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Selected-Credits-
Deductions-and-Exclusions-2017.pdf. 
64 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Distribution Table 2017 001, Distribution 
of Families, Cash Income, and Federal Taxes Under 2017 Current Law (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Distribution-of-
Tax-Burden-Current-Law-2017.pdf. 
65 See Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest Deduction, Tax L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2828970 (manuscript at 37 tbl.12). 
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 There are, to be sure, scenarios in which repeal of the SALT deduction might reduce after-
tax income inequality. For example, if the additional revenue from repealing the SALT deduction 
were rebated to taxpayers on a per-capita or per-household basis, then repeal would tend to make 
lower-income households better off and higher-income households worse off.  
 
 The distributional ambiguity of SALT repeal is especially apparent in the current political 
context. If the SALT deduction stays, then congressional Republicans and the Trump 
administration will presumably need to scale back other aspects of their tax-cutting package in 
order to hit their target of adding no more than $1.5 trillion to the deficit over the next decade.66 If 
they respond by, say, scrapping their proposal to repeal the estate tax and adding a new surtax on 
millionaires, then the distributional consequences of retaining the SALT deduction become more 
progressive. If they respond by scaling back their proposed expansion of the child tax credit, then 
the distributional consequences of retaining the SALT deduction look much more regressive. The 
key point is that the distributional consequences of the SALT deduction depend critically on the 
allocation of the additional revenue that would be generated by repeal. In the abstract, without 
making assumptions about alternative revenue sources and uses, statements about the 
distributional consequences of repealing the SALT deduction are virtually contentless. 
 
B.  Interstate Equity 
 
 A final argument for repealing the SALT deduction emphasizes the fact that the deduction 
disproportionately benefits certain states. This observation is undeniably correct, but its normative 
implications are nonobvious. Many provisions of the Internal Revenue Code affect different states 
differently: the enhanced oil recovery credit benefits Texas more than Maine; 67 the credit for solar 
energy aids sunny Arizona more than Washington State.68 There is almost certainly no good reason 
to believe that each provision of the Internal Revenue Code should affect each state equally. 
 
 Insofar as there is any value to interstate equity on a system-wide basis, however, the 
argument for repeal of the SALT deduction is shaky. Figure 1 serves to illustrate. It depicts the 
relationship between SALT deductions as a percentage of adjusted gross income and federal tax 
collections as a percentage of gross state product for all 50 states. The upward-sloping trend line 
indicates that the states benefiting more from the SALT deduction are, on balance, also the states 
that pay more in federal taxes (adjusted for economic output). The correlation is not perfect (r = 
0.31), and there are a few notable outliers (e.g., New York, which ranks number one in terms of 
SALT deductions as a percentage of AGI but near the middle of the pack in terms of federal tax 
collections as a percentage of gross state product). The key takeaway, though, is that the SALT 
deduction disproportionately benefits states that pay a disproportionate share of federal taxes. 
 
  
                                                
66 This target is enshrined in the budget resolution passed in October. See H. Con. Res. 71, 115th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (passed Oct. 26, 2017). 
67 I.R.C. § 43. 
68 I.R.C. § 48. 
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Figure 1. Relationship Between SALT Deduction and Overall Federal Tax Burden, by State, 
2014-201569 
    
 
 Again, it is worth emphasizing that the relationship in Figure 1 does not supply an 
independent argument in favor of the SALT deduction. In a nation of unequal states, variation in 
federal taxes as a percentage of gross state product is a feature of a progressive federal tax system, 
not a bug. What it does suggest is that interstate equity, insofar as it is a value worth pursuing, 
would not weigh in favor of repealing the SALT deduction. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 This essay has critically examined the main arguments for repealing the SALT deduction 
and has found that those arguments lack force. Far from unleashing economic growth, repealing 
the SALT deduction and using the resulting revenue to cut rates across the board would likely add 
                                                
69 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
by State (Millions of Current Dollars), http://bit.ly/2vXGbxz (last updated May 11, 2017); 
Internal Revenue Serv., Data Book—Oct. 1, 2014 to Sept. 30, 2015, at 12 tbl.5 (2015); U.S. 
Census Bureau, Table 1. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, 
Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016 (Dec. 2016); Walczak, supra note 
8, at 7 tbl.2. 
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to the deadweight loss of the overall tax system. It would distort decisions about the provision of 
public goods and services, push states toward suboptimal revenue-raising instruments, and 
potentially lead to more borrowing by states and localities in the short and medium term. Equity 
considerations (horizontal, vertical, and interstate) do little to enhance the case for repeal.  
 
In comparison, the status quo of partial deductibility has much to recommend it. Partial 
deductibility reflects the fact that a large chunk of state and local government spending goes toward 
items—such as education and health care—that receive treatment similar to deductibility when 
provided by the nonprofit and/or private sector. Partial rather than full deductibility also reflects 
the fact that some state and local government spending substitutes for consumption expenditures 
that would otherwise be ineligible for deduction. Perhaps a better system would be one in which 
all taxpayers could deduct state and local taxes in part—as opposed to a status quo in which some 
taxpayers (e.g., itemizers not subject to the AMT) come close to full deductibility, and others (e.g., 
taxpayers who claim the standard deduction) cannot deduct at all. Yet despite its imperfections, 
the status quo reflects a reasonable compromise between arguments in favor of deductibility and 
against.   
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Appendix 
 
The example in this appendix serves to illustrate the proposition that repeal of the SALT 
deduction negatively affects the supply of labor/capital and adds to the deadweight loss of the 
overall tax system. Consider two states, State X and State Y, each with identical populations and 
labor markets. For arithmetic ease, assume that the marginal product of labor for all workers is 
100, that workers’ pre-tax wages are equal to their marginal product, and that the labor supply 
curve in each state is Q = 100(1 – t), where t is the tax rate. Thus, with no tax, Q = 100 in each 
state (200 units of labor total). Deadweight loss is equal to one-half the square of the product of 
the tax per unit and the change in the equilibrium quantity as a result of the tax.70 Here, where ∆Q 
= 100∆t, deadweight loss is 0.5 x 100∆t x 100∆t, or 5000∆t2. 
 
Next, imagine a federal tax on labor of 40%. Labor output in each state falls from Q = 100 
to Q = 100(1 – 0.4) = 60 (120 units of labor total). Federal tax revenue from each state is 60 x 0.4 
x 100 = 2400 (4800 total). Deadweight loss in each state is 5000∆t2 = 800 (1600 total). 
 
Next, imagine that State X (but not State Y) levies an additional state tax of 10%. Assume 
that state taxes are deductible from federal taxable income, so the effective federal tax rate in State 
X is 36% and the combined federal-plus-state tax rate in State Y is 46%. Labor output in State X 
is now Q = 100(1 – 0.46) = 54. Federal tax revenue from State X is 54 x 0.36 x 100 = 1944. 
Deadweight loss in State X is 5000(0.46)2 = 1058. Federal tax revenue from State Y remains 2400, 
labor output in State Y remains at 60 units; and deadweight loss in State Y remains 800. Total 
federal tax revenue is now 1944 + 2400 = 4344; total labor output is now 54 + 60 = 114 units; and 
total deadweight loss is now 1058 + 800 = 1858. 
 
Now consider the effect of revenue-neutral repeal of the state tax deduction. For repeal to 
be revenue neutral for the federal government, the new federal tax rate (r) must be set such that 
federal tax revenue from State X + federal tax revenue from State Y = 4344. Thus: 
 
(QX)(r)(100) + (QY)(r)(100)    = 4344 
-20000r2 + 19000r – 4344    = 0 
r ≈ 0.3832 or r ≈ 0.5668 
 
Assuming that the federal government chooses the lower rate of 38.32%, labor output in 
State X is now approximately 51.68 units, and deadweight loss in State X is now 5000(0.4832)2 ≈ 
1167. Labor output in State Y is now approximately 61.68 units, and deadweight loss in State Y 
is now 5000(0.3832)2 ≈ 734. Total labor output is approximately 51.68 + 61.68 ≈ 113.36 units, and 
deadweight loss is approximately 1167 + 734 ≈ 1901. 
 
Here, the same amount of federal tax revenue (4344) can be raised either (a) with a 40% 
federal tax rate and a state tax deduction or (b) with a 38.32% tax rate and no state tax deduction. 
Option (b) results in lower labor output than option (a) (113.36 units < 114 units, a reduction of 
approximately 0.56%) and greater deadweight loss (1901 > 1858, an increase of approximately 
2.31%). 
                                                
70 See, e.g., Bernard Salanié, The Economics of Taxation 54 (MIT Press, 2003). 
